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THE S4 AND SERVICE BATTERY

by

Henry E. Wold

Captain, USMC

A Term Paper for
The Navy Graduate Comptrollership Program
The George Washington University
Washington, D. C.

May 1955

THE 84 AND 84VINE MATTER

by

Henry K. Fild

Georgetown, D.C.

A Text Paper for
The Navy Graduate Scholarship Program
The George Washington University
Washington, D. C.
May 1955

PREFACE

In Chapter II of this paper, the Marine Corps Staff Manual was used as a source for most of the material in the chapter. This manual at present is merely in the rough form and is intended for instructional use only at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. It has not yet been published in its final form and therefore is not an official document.

Most of the material for this paper was obtained through interviews at Marine Corps Headquarters and Marine Corps Schools. There was very little written material available as reference, so in many cases the author made assumptions that seemed valid to him but in no sense should this paper be construed as the views of the Marine Corps.

The author wishes to express his thanks to the many people at Marine Corps Headquarters and Marine Corps Schools that were so very helpful to him.

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INTRODUCTION

The big businessman of today realizes that he occupies the position held traditionally by the banker of years past. Both the financial security of his community and the welfare of the nation may depend upon the efficient operation of his business. Outside of government, he is the most potent force in the nation today. No area of his business is safe from scrutiny of the basis of improving operations. Probably one of the most vital segments subject to this scrutiny is the organizational structure of the business. In the rest of this chapter it will be shown that many companies owe their present organizational structure to the military model.

Early businesses were adequately operated by one man. Generally speaking, at that time the only large organizations were military. When a business began to increase in size, it could readily adopt the pattern of the army structure. This structure was quite simple. The equivalent of a non-commissioned officer was in charge of a group. These leaders themselves were responsible to a ranking officer. On a chart this would look like a large triangle made up of smaller triangles. At the top, one commander. The logical symmetry and simplicity of the army organization readily lent itself to business. Today this form of organization is still with us, commonly referred to as a "line" Organization.

INTRODUCTION

The big businessmen of today realize that he occupies the position held traditionally by the banker of yore past. Both the financial security of his community and the safety of the nation may depend upon the efficient operation of his business. Outside of government, he is the most potent force in the nation today. No area of his business is left free of the scrutiny of the eyes of approving operations. Probably one of the most vital agencies subject to this scrutiny is the organizational structure of the business. In the past at this chapter it will be shown that many companies owe their present organizational structure to the military model.

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The first refinement of organization in the army itself seemed to be necessitated by the problem of feeding vast numbers of troops. Fighting men could no longer forage for themselves and so one man was made responsible for the procurement of food. Here was the birth of the so-called "service" element, a part of what is known as the staff. In defining the word staff, it is understood that any function which is not primarily connected with the principal mission of the organization be known as a staff function.

As our hypothetical business becomes larger it becomes evident that each man cannot perform every detail inherent in his particular job. Again, following the army plan, a specialist is named to accomplish a certain portion of these tasks. An early specialist or staff task could be one as simple as supplying drinking water to other workers. The water carrier is not productive and as such fits in with our definition of staff.

So far we have discussed our staff function, that of service to the line organization. Now let us see if another staff function, called planning, could have come from the same source.

Planning is necessary in everything a person does. Any early businessman had to plan to know how much work he as an individual intended to do during the day. In comparison, an army commander frequently called councils of war to help him make his plans. The council, however, functioned for one particular problem. In the early 19th century the Prussian army, under Scharnhorst's urging, first set up a group of men whose full-time duty was planning. This group was known as the general staff.

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It was the increasing size and complexity of the army which was the main reasons for the origin of this group. Even at this relatively recent date the Prussian army was probably the largest organization in the state. Certainly, knowing the Prussian heritage, it was the most important. Once more, using the military structure as a guide, business adopted this idea of a planning staff.

With the addition of the planning function we have developed the basic skeleton of the line and staff organization. This basic skeleton has remained unchanged to this day.

The line is the arm that actually does the work. The staff provides tools for the arm with the service function, and aids the brain by means of the planning function.

Because of this heritage of business to the military in regards to this type of organization, an example will be shown in later chapters of a military organization of the line and staff structure that failed and the reasons for its failure. These reasons are applicable to civilian operations as well as military.

It was the interesting side and complexity of the story which was the main reason for the origin of this group. Even at this relatively recent date the Russian story was probably the largest organization in the world. Certainly, knowing the Russian language, it was the most important. Over time, using the military structure as a model, business adopted this idea of a plan, staff, and control.

With the addition of the planning function we have developed the basic skeleton of the firm and staff organization. This model structure has remained unchanged to this day. The firm is the one that actually does the work. The staff provides logic for the firm with the service function, and adds the brain for means of the planning function. Examples of this pattern of business if you will, in regard to this type of organization, an example will be shown in later chapters of a military organization of the firm and itself structure that failed and the reasons for its failure. These reasons are applicable to civilian organizations as well as military.

THE S4 - STAFF OFFICER

The Staff Manual of the U. S. Marine Corps describes the individual and collective duties of staffs and staff members at all levels in the Corps. Though similar in many ways, Marine and Army staffs are not parallel in structure. The Marine Corps is an organization in which individual assignments, unit missions and organizations determine the character and effort of the subordinate elements. There are no separate arms or services which special staff officers represent, as in the Army. Though the staff officer is not necessarily a specialist in his field, he is required to have a knowledge of the operations, organization, administration, staff proceedings and the capabilities and limitations of all the elements of the command. Also he must have an understanding and appreciation of the problems of the subordinate troop units and should have had experience in these units. The staff officer must be able to express his ideas and recommendations clearly. Notice that one of the requirements for staff duty is experience in a line unit of the organization. This is something that many times is not required today in business. A common criticism of staff men is that they are too often concerned with things, not people. By insuring that staff members at one time have been in the position of the line, chances of being accused of this failing are lessened.

As far as the staff's relationship with command, the Staff Manual specifies that the commander alone is responsible for the

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success or failure of his unit. This is the one basic responsibility that cannot be delegated. In the commander's discharge of his responsibilities, the staff is not in the command chain. The staff does not issue any orders or plans, but rather they are issued through the regular command channels. These command channels are through the line organization.

As to what comprises the staff, they are defined as those people who assist the commander in the implementation of his command responsibilities. Members of the staff possess co-equal status as regards their inter-staff relationships. Each staff member has equal access to and opportunity to present matters of importance to the commander.

Command of the staff remains with the commander. In a general staff, the actions of the staff are co-ordinated by the Chief of Staff; on a regimental or battalion level by the Executive Officer, (the second in command).

The methods by which the staff assists the commander are by procuring information required by the commander, planning, staff supervision of the execution of orders, maintaining records and preparing reports, and bringing to the commander's attention such matters that require his action or about which he should be informed.

There are different types of staffs. A commander's aides constitute his personal staff. The general staff is concerned with overall planning. This is broken down into four areas under the four general staff officers. The first area, (G1), is concerned with Personnel and Administration; the second, (G2), has

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There are different types of staffs. A commander's staff consists of his personal staff. The general staff is concerned with overall planning. This is broken down into four areas and the four general staff officers. The first area, (G1), is concerned with personnel and administration; the second, (G2), has

the providing of Intelligence; the third, (G3), is charged with Training and Operations; the fourth, (G4), has the Logistics responsibility. There is yet one more staff, The Special Staff, which advises the commander in regards to their special skills, such as artillery, naval gunfire support, etc.

In the regimental and battalion staffs there is no personal staff for the commander and the battalion staff corresponds to the general staff. The Special Staff functions the same in regards to any special area which the commander may direct his attention.

The general (and battalion or regimental) staff are primarily advisors, planners, co-ordinators and supervisors. They must keep themselves free for continuously estimating the situation and planning. They must not allow themselves to become engrossed with the operations of units and activities which are the functions of commanders and special staff officers.

The action that a staff officer takes is in three forms. These forms are individual action, co-ordinated action with other members of the line or staff, and action requiring a decision by the commander. In co-ordinated action, the conference is stressed. These conferences should have a definite agenda and follow parliamentary rules.

In regards to the performance of staff supervision, probably the major complaint against staff officers, the staff is instructed to be unobtrusive and avoid interference with the prerogatives of subordinate commanders. The staff officer must not

the provision of intelligence; the latter (55), in charge with Training and Operations; the former (56), in charge with the Staff. There is for one more staff, the Special Staff, which advises the commander in regard to their special skills, such as artillery, naval gunfire support, etc.

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function as part of a spy system, but should notify any commanding officer that he intends to visit his unit.

It is interesting to note that in line with the increasing trend towards decentralization and semi-autonomy in modern business, the military in its organization has had varying degrees of decentralization in its battalions and regiments. At any rate, the prerogatives of any commander, no matter what level he is in the chain of command, are jealously guarded by the commander. The staff officer must exercise considerable tact to insure that he does not intend to usurp any of these prerogatives.

Thus far in the chapter principles, duties, and qualifications of staff officers in general have been discussed. Now the duties of a particular staff officer, the G4 on the general staff and the S4 on the regimental and battalion staffs, will be illustrated.

The G4's and S4's primary responsibility is in the field of logistics. This takes in the fields of supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation and troop movements, service, and other miscellaneous functions.

Supply consists of planning supply requirements, requisitioning, procuring, storing and distributing these supplies, allocating critical materials, salvage, and collecting and disposing of excess supplies.

Transportation has to do with preparing plans for transporting units or personnel by land, sea, or air, selecting non-tactical routes of movement, requirements and priorities for

function as part of a very special, but usually definite and constant function. The officer thus is intended to lead his unit.

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Supply consists of planning supply requirements, requisitioning, receiving, storing and distributing these supplies, allocating available materials, savings, and collection and distribution of excess supplies.

Transportation has to do with preparing plans for moving personnel or personnel by land, sea, or air, selecting non-essential routes of movement, requirements and activities for

service units, and plans for the movement of service units.

Evacuation and hospitalization include transportation of casualties and the facilities for treatment.

The service function recommends requirements for employment of service units and indigenous personnel, planning the maintenance of existing facilities, recommending acquisition, allocation, improvement and disposition of real estate, fiscal plans, regulations governing property accounting, plans for sanitation measures, and supervising food services.

One point that should be emphasized is that the staff officer is not directly responsible for the execution of these plans. Everything above is a plan, with the exception of the supervision of the food services. The staff responsibility is the formation and development of plans that are feasible and practical.

Supervision by the staff is a function that is frequently criticized. Alvin Brown, in his book The Armor of Organization¹, states that if a plan is well thought out, it will need no further interpretation or amplification. The line man therefore is responsible to his superior in the chain of command for the proper execution of the plan. Mr. Brown further contends that staff supervision, which he believes is inseparable with actual control, is the appointment of someone else other than the supervisor to see that the supervisor does his job. Certainly it is

¹Alvin Brown, The Armor of Organization, (New York: Hibbert Printing Co., 1953).

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an area that the Marine Corps recognizes as a dangerous one, as it cautions the staff man not to trespass into the domain of the line operator in this respect. Whether this admonition alone is enough to keep the staff out of line operations is a moot question.

Thus far the staff role of planning has been explained. In the next chapter the service element, as it is conducted in a Marine artillery battalion, will be discussed.

on area that the Marine Corps considers as a dangerous one, as it contains the staff and has the danger of the line operator in this respect. Another consideration alone is enough to keep the staff out of line operations is a good question.

Thus the staff role of planning has been examined. In the next chapter for related aspect, we will be concerned in a Marine artillery battalion, will be discussed.

The first chapter of this book is devoted to the study of the Marine Corps as a whole. It is a study of the Marine Corps as a whole, and not of the individual units. The second chapter is devoted to the study of the Marine Corps as a whole, and not of the individual units. The third chapter is devoted to the study of the Marine Corps as a whole, and not of the individual units.

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SERVICE BATTERY

As Service Battery was an integral part of the 105 millimeter howitzer battalion under the K Tables of Organization, it might be best to describe the organization of the battalion.

The mission of the battalion is to furnish artillery support for the infantry elements of a Marine Division. One infantry regiment normally has priority on the battalion fires, but the artillery regimental headquarters may direct its firing elsewhere. The battalion has the necessary personnel and replacement items to operate with an infantry regiment for thirty days with replenishment of consumable supplies.

Under the K tables the battalion was made up of five batteries. Three of these batteries were identical in structure. These were the firing batteries, each with some 130 men manning six 105 millimeter howitzers per battery. Each battery, reinforced with extra personnel from battalion headquarter, could be attached to an infantry battalion for a small amphibious operation.

The fourth battery was Headquarters Battery. In it were the fire direction, communication, and survey personnel along with the necessary housekeeping troops for the battalion headquarters.

The last battery was Service Battery. This was organized into two platoons, service and ammunition, two separate sections,

SECTION BATTERY

An Service Battery was an integral part of the 102nd Infantry Division. The 102nd Infantry Division was organized under the X Table of Organization. It might be best to describe the organization of the Battalion. The mission of the Battalion is to furnish artillery support for the Infantry elements of a Battle Division. One Infantry Regiment normally has six battalions in the Battalion. The Battalion has the necessary personnel and equipment to furnish support for the Infantry elements of a Battle Division. The Battalion has the necessary personnel and equipment to furnish support for the Infantry elements of a Battle Division. The Battalion has the necessary personnel and equipment to furnish support for the Infantry elements of a Battle Division.

Under the X Table the Battalion was made up of five battalions. Three of these battalions were located in the rear. These were the firing battalions, each with some 150 men manning the 102 millimeter howitzers. The fourth battery, which was formed with extra personnel from the Battalion headquarters, could be attached to an Infantry Battalion for a small antiaircraft section.

The fourth battery was Headquarters Battery. In it were the fire director, communication, and survey personnel along with the necessary supporting troops for the Battalion headquarters.

The first battery was Service Battery. This was organized into two platoons, service and ammunition, two separate sections.

personnel and battery service, and the battery headquarters. Service platoon consisted of three sections, supply, motor maintenance, and ordnance maintenance. Each of these sections had an officer in charge. The ammunition platoon had three ammunition sections with an officer in command of the platoon. The battalion personnel section served under the adjutant and his assistant, the personnel officer. The battery service section contained battery supply, motor transport and office personnel.

Each of the sections and platoons, with the exception of the battery service section, had the mission of providing their services for the battalion as a whole. Thus, the supply section consisted of the battalion supply officer, the top supply non-commissioned officer, and sufficiency personnel to maintain the battalion supply records and warehouse. The motor and ordnance maintenance section were set up along basically the same lines. The ammunition platoon was in charge of the battalion ammunition dump and the supply of ammunition to the three firing batteries. Motor transportation for this purpose was furnished by the Service Battery service section. The battalion personnel had the office personnel in both the adjutant's and personnel officer's offices. Their function was the assignment of personnel, maintenance of personnel records and the stenographic duties in connection with the adjutant's work.

The Service Battery commander was responsible for the leadership, training, operation and morale of his battery. As the structure of the battery suggests, it was probably one of the most

personnel and battery service, and the battery commander, service division consisted of three sections, supply, motor maintenance, and ordnance maintenance. Each of these sections an officer in charge. The battery commander, in turn, was responsible for the battery in general. The battery commander was also responsible for the battery in general. The battery commander was also responsible for the battery in general. The battery commander was also responsible for the battery in general.

Each of the sections and divisions, with the exception of the battery service section, had the mission of providing their services for the battery as a whole. Thus, the supply section consisted of the battery supply officer, the top supply company, and sufficient personnel to maintain the battery supply records and personnel. The motor and ordnance maintenance section were not always directly the same lines. The ammunition division was in charge of the battery ammunition and the supply of ammunition to the three firing batteries. Motor maintenance for this purpose was provided by the battery service section. The battery commander had the office personnel in both the supply and personnel officer's office. Their function was the assignment of personnel, maintenance of personnel records and the assignment of duties in connection with the battery's work.

The battery commander was responsible for the battery's training, operation and maintenance of the battery. It was probably one of the

complex units of its size (117 officers and men) in the Marine Corps. While the entire battery was theoretically under the control of the battery commander, in some cases the chain of command was violated. This chain of command started with the battalion commander, down to the Service Battery commander and through him to the men in his battery. In the adjutant's case, however, he, as the S1 and member of the battalion staff, dealt directly with the commanding officer of the battalion. In effect the S1 was carried on Service Battery roles as a matter of record only. Another interesting problem of the command chain was the position of the personnel officer. On the organization chart he was responsible to the adjutant for the proper performance of his job. Theoretically the adjutant is responsible to the Service Battery commander for the operation of his section. How much authority did the Service Battery Commander have in dealing with the personnel officer? In most cases the adjutant was left strictly in charge of his section, with the Service Battery commander responsible for the messing, billeting, and schooling in basic military subjects of the troops in the personnel section.

Service Battery, as it was set up, had one function and one function only. That was to provide services of a specialized nature to the battalion generally and to the firing batteries in particular. Previously this function was a function of a combined Headquarters and Service Battery. In the next chapter, the reasons for the dissolution and rejuvenation of this combined battery will be discussed.

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THE MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE OF THE S4 AND SERVICE BATTERY

In 1949 the Marine Corps put into effect the K Table of Organization. This described in detail the exact structure, on a peacetime and wartime basis, of the entire Fleet Marine Force. Though the infantry unit's structure was purely a Marine innovation, the organization of the artillery units followed, to a large extent, those of their Army counterparts. It was by following this Army philosophy that the Service Battery described in the last chapter was set up. The basic idea behind the origination of this unit was to effect greater flexibility of the service element and place it under the command of the person, the S4, who made the plans for its use and deployment.

The S4 now had two hats, one as Service Battery commander and the other as the S4 on the battalion staff. In the Introduction, the staff as an entity was defined as all phases of the activity not having as their primary mission the basic mission of the organization. It was further stated that the two main duties of the staff were planning and service. With this merger of the S4 and Service Battery, the responsibilities for performance of the two functions were now the responsibilities of one person. The Table of Organization recognized this by giving the title of the position as "S4 and Service Battery Commander."

Was there anything wrong with the idea of combining the two staff functions of planning and service? It is a common

THE MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE OF THE 34 AND SERVICE BATTALION

In 1949 the Marine Corps put into effect the E Table of Organization. This described in detail the exact structure, on a personnel and working basis, of the entire Fleet Marine Force. Though the Infantry unit's structure was largely a Marine innovation, the organization of the artillery units followed, to a large extent, those of their Army counterparts. It was by taking this Army philosophy that the Service Battalions described in the last chapter were set up. The basic form behind the organization of this unit was to effect greater flexibility of the service element and place it under the command of the parent, the 34, who made the plans for its use and development.

The 34 now had two batts, one as Service Battalion command and the other as the 34 on the Battalion staff. In the introduction, the staff as an entity was defined as all phases of the activity not having an administrative relation to the main of the organization. It was further stated that the two main duties of the staff were planning and service. With this recognition of the 34 and Service Battalions, the responsibilities for performance of the two functions were now the responsibility of one person. The table of organization was revised with by giving the title of the position as "34 and Service Battalion Commander."

Was there anything wrong with the idea of combining the two staff functions of planning and service? If so a common

device in the military service. The commander of the Marine Division engineers is a member of the commanding general's special staff. The commander of the artillery regiment occupies a like position as the commanding general's adviser on artillery matters. But in no case does a member of the general staff have this dual responsibility. Though a battalion S4 is not on a general staff, his duties are precisely the same as the duties of his counterpart on the general staff. Why then was this merger put into effect? The obvious reason is that the combined Headquarters and Service Battery was not providing adequate service for the firing batteries.² This battery was large in numbers and unwieldy in administration. Its personnel were all working for two bosses, the Headquarters and Service Battery commander and the heads of their respective staff sections. There is always a conflict between the heads of battalion staff sections and the battery commander. Each has his job to do but must use the same men to do them. An example of this conflict would be when the Headquarters and Service Battery commander would need men for a working party of some sort and the S3 needs the same men in order to instruct them in fire control techniques. By cutting the battery in half and forming the two batteries, it was hoped that the smaller number of men per battery would lessen this unwieldiness. By placing the appropriate staff member, the S4, in command

²In research at Headquarters, Marine Corps and Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, no definite authority was stated for the origin of Service Battery, so the author was forced to make his own.

device in the military service. The commander of the Marine Division engineers is a member of the commanding General's special staff. The commander of the military regiment occupies a like position on the commanding General's staff on military matters. But in no case does a member of the General staff have this dual responsibility. Through a battery he is not on a General staff, his duties are generally the same as the duties his counterparts on the General staff. Why then are his energies put into effect? The obvious reason is that the combined Headquarters and Service Battery was not providing adequate service for the firing batteries.⁵ This battery was large in number and unskilled in administration. Its personnel were all working to one purpose, the Headquarters and Service Battery commander and the needs of their respective staff sections. There is always a conflict between the needs of battery sections and the battery commander. Each has his job to do and each has the same to do. An example of this conflict would be when the Headquarters and Service Battery commander would send men to work on the firing battery of some sort and the battery commander would be unable to instruct them in the proper technique. By sending the battery in bulk and leaving the two batteries, it was hoped the smaller number of men per battery would lessen this conflict. By placing the appropriate staff member, the SA, in command

⁵In reference to Headquarters, Marine Corps and Marine Corps, the author, Virginia, no definite authority was stated for the origin of Service Battery, so the author was forced to make his own.

it was hoped that this conflict between battery commanders and section heads would also be lessened. As both a staff member and operating commander of a battery he could better co-ordinate the two functions in his battery. (See Tables 1 and 2.)

Poor control of the service elements was another weakness of the combined battery. With one person responsible for both planning and the execution of the plans, responsibility would be definitely fixed.

Tactical reasons also entered into the split. In a fast moving combat situation it might be better to have the control of the service elements under one man. For purposes of dispersion to avoid enemy observation it would be an improvement to have a separate unit off by itself.

One last reason for the split was the fact that morale in the service elements was never as high as it was in the firing batteries. This was the case because of two main reasons. First, the firing batteries looked down on them because they were not actively concerned with pumping shells into the enemy. Second, very often the men that were misfits in the line batteries were transferred into Headquarters and Service Battery. By the formation of a separate battery there was hope that the battery personnel would be given higher status in the battalion and that a pride of unit would help the members do their jobs more efficiently.

There were many good reasons for the formation of Service Battery under the command of the S4. Unfortunately, there were also reasons why it would not work.

It was hoped that this conflict between battery commanders and section heads would also be lessened. As soon as a staff member and operating commander of a battery he would better co-ordinate the two functions in his battery. (See Tables I and 2.)

Four members of the service elements are another source of the combined battery. With one person responsible for both planning and the execution of the plan, responsibility would be definitely fixed.

Technical reasons also weighed into the matter. In a line moving combat situation it might be better to have the control of the service elements under one man. The purpose of doing this to avoid any observation it would be an improvement to have a separate unit act by itself.

One last reason for the split was the fact that none in the service elements was never as high as it was in the first battery. This was the case because of two main reasons. First the firing batteries looked down on them because they were not actively concerned with carrying shells into the enemy. Second, very often the two that were similar in the line position were transferred into headquarters and service battery. By the formation of a separate battery there was hope that the battery personnel would be given higher status in the battalion and that a pride of unit would help the members to keep jobs more efficiently.

There were many good reasons for the formation of service battery under the command of the Lt. Unfortunately, there were also reasons why it would not work.

In January of 1954, a new Table of Organization, the L series, was adopted by the Marine Corps for Fleet Marine Force units. In this table, Headquarters Battery and Service Battery were again combined. The impetus behind these organizational changes was the constant effort to place more men in the line units from the ranks of the service elements. The separate Headquarters and Service batteries were the first units in the artillery battalion to come up for revision. What with duplication in the troop messing facilities, supply, motor transport and administrative functions, the merger of these two batteries into one again was effected. (See Table 3.)

The personnel factor was not the only reason for the merger, however. It was evident, in most cases, that the S4 was performing his two jobs in a mediocre fashion. The many administrative demands placed upon him in his duties as battery commander were detracting from his duties as S4. Command is a duty that requires more of a person in the military than it does in a comparable civilian position. A commander may delegate authority but he always retains the responsibility for the unit's success or failure. In the Service Battery the commander had no executive officer to take a large amount of the administrative detail off his shoulders. The battery first sergeant was a help in this respect, but there were many events that required an officer's presence. There were other officers in Service

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Battery, but their duties left them little free time to aid in administrative work.

Earlier it was mentioned that in service units there was always the problem of manpower to perform the housekeeping details and the regular tasks of supply, ordnance and motor transport. By the formation of Service Battery it was intended that the S4 as a battery commander would be the best person to reconcile this problem of the constant shortage. Certainly there is no way to alleviate the constant personnel demands for guard duty, mess duty and working parties. But the formation of Service Battery also increased, in some degree, the number of these housekeeping tasks. Where the S4 knew better which men could be spared from their regular tasks to do these odd jobs, the increase in the numbers of men needed served to nullify this advantage. The Headquarters Battery commander had the same problem, so it was practical to combine the two batteries and have him take over all these problems.

Placing the service elements under the S4 did not offer enough improvement in control to offset the necessary increase in personnel. The same could be said for the tactical advantage of a separate Service Battery area under its own commander. It was considered a luxury that did not warrant the extra personnel.

Morale did take a turn for the better in Service Battery. Unfortunately the battery was still the recipient of a certain

Battery, but their duties left them little free time to aid in administrative work.

Earlier it was mentioned that in service units there was always the problem of manpower to perform the housekeeping details and the regular tasks of supply, ordnance and motor transport. By the formation of Service Battery it was intended that the 84 as a battery command would be the best person to coordinate this problem of the command's maintenance. Certainly there is no way to eliminate the constant personnel demands for guard duty, mess duty and various details. But the formation of Service Battery also increased, in some degree, the number of these housekeeping tasks. Where the 84 had before which men could be freed from their regular tasks to do house and farm, the increase in the number of men needed would be nullified in some degree. The Headquarters Battery command had the same problem, so it was practical to combine the two batteries and have him take over all these problems.

Placing the service elements under the 84 did not offer enough improvement in control to offset the necessary increase in personnel. The same could be said for the material elements of a separate Service Battery area under its own command. It was considered a luxury that did not warrant the extra personnel.

Now the 84 takes a turn for the battery in Service Battery. Unfortunately the battery was still the equivalent of a certain

group of men who were considered unfit to serve on the guns. These men very often ended up in the ammunition platoon. Any good man in this platoon, and there were some, naturally felt they were slighted. This situation would be true whether or not the battery was separate or combined. Again the need for economy in use of personnel outweighed the lesser considerations.

Service Battery was originated to give better service to the battalion. It accomplished this but the demands on the S4 and the extra personnel needed did not make the slight increase in efficiency worth the price.

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CONCLUSIONS

In studying the birth and death of Service Battery, certain conclusions may be drawn.

First, the subdivision of a function with a resultant increase in personnel is not necessarily effective. For example, there had to be two motor transport chiefs when Headquarters and Service Battery was split. The resulting increase in efficiency was not in proportion.

Second, the subdividing of a cumbersome organization into two smaller units is not always the answer to the problem. In this case, size of the unit was not the deciding factor, but rather a combination of size and complexity. The small size of the two new batteries was a help in combatting the unwieldiness, but the reduction in size did not decrease, rather it increased the complexities of the problem as a whole. Two men instead of one were now worrying about the same type of problem, neither one coming up with a perfect answer.

Third, the staff functions of planning and service do not work well together if the planning phase is broad in scope and is important enough to be on the general or battalion staff level. The problem of staff supervision is avoided by a merger of the two functions of planning and the carrying out of these plans by a service unit, but a greater problem of becoming too much involved in administrative details may be introduced.

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Fourth, though not an identifiable factor in this case, the ability of staff organizations to expand and become the served instead of the servers, must be constantly kept under surveillance.

As noted in the Introduction, the similarity between the military line and staff organization and its business counterparts is a strong one. The discussion of the formation and dissolution of Service Battery has certainly left no pat answers to the problems connected with this type of organization.

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two village line and staff organization and the business
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TABLE 1

Table of Organization for a Service Battery 105MM
Howitzer Battalion Artillery Regiment,
Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
showing internal organization and
strength of component units*

SERV BTRY 105MM HOW BN

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Peace	6	56	0	0
War	8	109	0	0

BATTERY HQ

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>

Peace	1	5	0	0
War	1	8	0	0

AMMO PLAT

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>

Peace	0	0	0	0
War	1	43	0	0

SERV PLAT

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>

Peace				
War				

BN PERS SEC

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>

Peace	2	8	0	0
War	3	21	0	0

Plat Hq

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>

Peace	0	0	0	0
War	1	4	0	0

Sup Sec

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>

Peace	1	6	0	0
War	1	6	0	0

BTRY SERV SEC

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>

Peace	0	11	0	0
War	0	14	0	0

Ammo Sec

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>

Peace	0	13	0	0
War	0	13	0	0

Motor Maint Sec

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>

Peace	1	10	0	0
War	1	12	0	0

Ord Maint Sec

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>

Peace	1	3	0	0
War	1	5	0	0

Legend: Peace and War
War only

*Source: Table of Organization - Number K-1105, Headquarters
United States Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C., 16 May 1949

TABLE 2 - HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

Table of Organization as described in Table 1*

HQ BTRY 105MM HOW BN

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	8	97	0	0
War	10	154	1	10

	BN HQ		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	3	4	0	0		
War	4	4	0	0		

	COMM PLAT		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	1	46	0	0		
War	1	74	0	0		

	OPERATIONS SEC		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	1	8	0	0		
War	2	10	0	0		

	Plat Hq.		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	1	2	0	0		
War	1	6	0	0		

	SERVICE SEC		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	0	19	0	0		
War	0	24	0	0		

	Radio Sec		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	0	18	0	0		
War	0	25	0	0		

	MEDICAL SEC		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	0	0	0	0		
War	0	0	1	10		

	Wire Sec		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	0	26	0	0		
War	0	43	0	0		

	SURVEY SEC		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	1	12	0	0		
War	1	18	0	0		

	COUNTER-MORTAR RADAR SEC		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	0	0	0	0		
War	0	15	0	0		

	BATTERY HQ		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	1	6	0	0		
War	1	7	0	0		

	LIAISON SEC		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Peace	1	2	0	0		
War	1	2	0	0		

Legend: Peace and War
War Only

*Source: Table of Organization - Number K-1106, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C. 16 May 1949.

TABLE 3

Table of Organization for Headquarters & Service Battery
105MM Howitzer Battalion (Towed) Artillery Regiment,
Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force showing inter-
nal organization and strength of component units*

HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE BATTERY

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
17	234	1	10

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
9	22	0	0

Headqtrs. Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
2	4	0	0

S-1; Adjutant Sec

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
2	15	0	0

S-2 Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	0	0	0

S-3 Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	0	0	0

S-4 Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	0	0	0

Liaison Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
2	3	0	0

INTELLIGENCE
PLATOON

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	15	0	0

Intelligence
Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	2	0	0

Counter-Mortar
Radar Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
0	13	0	0

MEDICAL SECTION

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
0	0	1	10

OPERATIONS
PLATOON

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
2	33	0	0

Fire
Direction
Sec

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	15	0	0

Survey
Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	18	0	0

BATTERY H&S
SECTION

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	21	0	0

COMMUNICATION PLATOON

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	88	0	0

Platoon Hq

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	7	0	0

Radio Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
0	35	0	0

Wire Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
0	46	0	0

BATTALION SERVICE PLATOON

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
3	55	0	0

Platoon Hq.

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
0	1	0	0

Motor Maint. Sec.

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	8	0	0

Supply Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	10	0	0

Ammo. & Ord. Sec.

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	36	0	0

Section Hq.

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1	6	0	0

Ammo Section

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
0	10	0	0

*Source: Table of Organization - Number L-1107, Headquarters
United States Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C., 6 Jan. 1954.

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